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I. Breadth and Depth: Ancient and Modern Examples
Philosophy has been defined by Richard McKeon as the activity of “pushing any question
to an extreme.” This definition indicates the breadth of philosophy, because it is
concerned with any question, and the depth of philosophy, because it pushes question
to an extreme. Knowledge of what is broadest and deepest has been called “wisdom”.
Socrates’ distinction between human and divine wisdom made it love of wisdom,
philosophia. Almost any university catalogue lists courses in the philosophy of just
about every subject matter as well as courses that are about every or nearly every
subject matter: since they all have subjects, seek knowledge, such as metaphysics,
epistemology, logic, and the philosophy of language. But the list of arts and sciences
and their organization are not hard, unchanging facts. Since any question leads to
philosophy, every subject can be the source of first philosophy, the architectonic art by
which other arts are defined. The history of philosophy is a history inspired by new
developments in arts and sciences from mathematics to rhetoric that give rise to new
philosophical reflection and new answers to fundamental questions. It is a process of
renewal and reorganization of the arts and sciences. My samples of breadth and depth
will be familiar to many.
Plato’s dialogues are often about virtues, but even failure to define them leads to
questions of knowledge, as in the Meno, where inspiration that achieves true opinions
about virtue is related to knowledge of virtue as shadows to reality. His dialectic
assimilates opposites and connects diverse subjects. An abrasive dialogue about
rhetoric leads to the conclusion that true rhetoric is dialectic; a dialogue on love reveals
that all love aims at wisdom; poetry (what we call “literature”) achieves the goal of
depicting the noble acts of noble persons when it becomes dialectics; a dialogue on
physics shows that the motions of the universe follow eternal forms apprehended by
philosophy. But even the physical universe is said to be a “thinking animal” and found
to have the same virtues as the ideal city. If reflection on the good is ethics, sinc “the
true, the good, and the beautiful are one” all arts and sciences are ethics . How is depth
achieved, then, in Plato’s conclusive dialogues whose breadth is all things?
In the Republic, Socrates searches for justice by discovering how an ideal city would
come into existence. At a crucial stage of its generation, the city needs to know what
material goods to produce and, as such, the difference between friend and enemy, i. e.
between what must be produced and what must be defended against. Justice is
defined, not as a particular function of the ideal city, but (like health for the body) by
each function doing its job well. Those functions include production, defense and the
knowledge of what to produce and what resist. That knowledge of what is good guides
the city by educating its citizens. As “knowledge of the good”, it is wisdom. But this
conclusion is a scandal, since philosophers are widely regarded as peculiar and useless
at best. To defend his city, Socrates must show philosophy’s knowledge is useful. True
opinion chooses the good, but cannot be depended upon to remain true in a new
situation. A mind with knowledge is to one with true opinion like a person awake is to
one dreaming.
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But even knowledge is not enough, for knowledge has reasons and reasons have
further, deeper reasons and all knowledge of goods depends on knowing the Good. The
ideal city was discovered by a process of generation beginning with the goods human
beings need in order to survive, including help from others in order to produce and
distribute material goods needed to live. Additional goods were discovered that are
necessary to insure survival but also make for a good life. Completeness, the ideal, was
defined by the city having all the goods for a good human life. From the beginning, the
search depended on the idea of good, an idea that goes unexamined until Socrates asks
how the philosopher can know that the virtues are good if he does not know what good
is. This is pushing the question to an extreme.
However, Socrates denies that he knows the Good and implies that it is beyond human
capacity to know it. I. e., he announces the need for divine wisdom. Whereas his search
for the ideal city began with human need, the Good itself is so complete that it is the
last object of inquiry and for the same reason the first cause of the existence and
intelligibility and thus of the goodness of all things. It cannot be grasped because it is
the cause of intelligibility, so no idea can explain it; and at the same time every idea is its
effect, so that anything a mind thinks is an intimation of the Good and Socrates can talk
about it by analogy with the sun. This is an idea of God.
In contrast with Plato, Aristotle distinguishes sciences with respect to their subject
matters and methods of inquiry, but he also distinguishes them with respect to their
aims, arguing that for ethics and politics it is not enough to know what it is good; the
aim is to be and to have the good, which requires action. In a philosophy of plural
sciences, depth requires going beyond them, since they cannot account for their own
principles, in a science of sciences aimed at giving an account of what it is in the nature
of things that makes knowledge possible. Aristotle called this science “first philosophy”;
it was later named “metaphysics”. Ultimately, the discussion there, as in the deepest
reaches of Plato’s dialogues, is once more God, but it is not an ethical discussion.
Metaphysics is one of three theoretical sciences, along with physics and mathematics,
while ethics and politics are practical sciences aimed at action.
In this way, the relation of depth of understanding to virtue in Aristotle diverges from
Plato’s. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics achieves depth by going beyond the discussion
of the moral virtues, which are habits, to consider the understanding of virtue, which he
called and the Romans translated prudentia. Prudence is the knowledge of
what is good in life and how to get it and, as such, is the highest form of practical
knowledge. But the idea of virtues that are additions to human nature without in any
way violating the laws of nature, depends on a conception of being, of the nature of
things, as rational but not identical with reason. Only on such an assumption can reason
make things be of practical significance that neither violate nor are dependent upon the
laws of nature. Establishing the nature of being is the task of metaphysics and the
distinctive intellectual virtue required for that task is wisdom. It follows that a person
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who has wisdom has completed prudence in a way analogous to what prudence does
for moral virtue. Such a person would have greater understanding of the good in
human life because of greater understanding of what it is to be known and to be true.
In this way, the greatest depth coincides with the greatest breadth because the cause of
being and for being knowable is the same for all.

Aristotle described his teacher Plato’s philosophy as “making all things thoughts”. To
another admired predecessor, the atomist, Democritus, he applied the opposite
criticism, that he “made all thoughts things”. Democritus sought to explain all things in
terms of indivisible (means “cannot be cut”), invisible, tiny particles that are
plural in number, each with extension, figure, density (atoms are “the full”, ),
motion, and the emptiness (space is “the empty”, ) necessary for there to be
motion. This reduces all the sciences to physics, knowledge of necessary relations
among the atoms. There is no need for metaphysics since the atoms and their motions
explain all things and nothing explains them. What Aristotle called practical and
productive sciences are about human feelings and preferences and can achieve only
probable beliefs because they are the effects of the impact of atoms on the human
body. Since these affects are the effects of the impacts of atoms on the atoms of the
human nervous system, knowledge about them depends on physics.
On the other hand, The Sophists were regarded as importantly wrong by Plato, but
mostly only as fallacious reasoners by Aristotle. They reduced things and thoughts to
words, elevating rhetoric and poetic, the arts of words, to the rank of first philosophy,
by making the true, beautiful, and good whatever someone says they are, if he can
make others agree. This is what Protagoras meant when he said that “Man is the
measure of all things” and, in this sense, their maker. Gorgias’ book, On Non‐Being or
Nature, defends the extreme skepticism of this philosophy in a series of abstruse
arguments in support of three related propositions: that nothing is; if anything exists,
we cannot know it; if we can know it, we cannot communicate our knowledge. The
depth of philosophy here is in the denial of knowledge of the first causes of existence,
knowledge, and truth and in that denial showing the breadth of a very practical
philosophy aimed at using words to persuade that things, such as particles or fields exist
or that Helen, though she ran away with Paris, was not disloyal to Menelaus. In the
new, democratic city‐states, the Sophists were sought‐after, well‐paid teachers of
people who sought political influence through speeches made in the assembly.
Philosophical innovations arise out of changing circumstances, including innovations in
arts and sciences, borrowing intellectual devices from other disciplines in the effort to
offer solutions to problems that stymie them or to help extend the influence of their
successes to other fields of inquiry and endeavor. The ancient philosophers were
moved to their reflections by questions arising from the development of mathematics
and science as well as the growth of democracy. Science and politics were also crucial
influences in the development of modern philosophy. But circumstances only prompt
thought, are the occasions not the cause of understanding. Extension of the art of
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mechanics to conceptions of the operations of nature had already begun when 17th
century thinkers found new ways to extend these practices in their reading of De Rerum
Natura (On the Nature of Things) by the first century BCE Roman atomist, Lucretius.
They developed a method, combining atomism with Euclid in what they called “the
geometric method”, of combining simple, clear and distinct, ideas, by simple steps, into
more complex ones for the explanation of complex things and events in nature. This
method for both discovery and proof enabled modern science to replace Aristotelian
essences and final causes with mechanical causes, thereby reducing nature to matter
and motion and depriving it of inherent ethical meaning and purpose.
By the same method, man in the state of nature became an atom in motion. By thinking
of the impact of them of the motions of other men, they could be supposed to have
discovered the means by which to achieve peace by establishing law and government,
orderly systems in nature, like the solar system, replacing chaotic conflict. Different
versions of the method were developed in both the philosophy of nature and poltical
philosophy. With nature conceived as monads by Leibniz, extended substance by
Descartes, particles by Galileo and Newton, solid bodies by Locke, etc., variations on the
idea of government arising out of the state of nature resulted.
So modern philosophy produced new forms of depth as it turned the philosophy of
nature into natural science. If deeper understanding makes virtue better, so deeper
understanding makes belief better in the sense of increasing understanding. Since
ancient times, philosophers have been considered peculiar, pondering puzzles with no
application, such as the attempts to prove the existence of the world. Nobody in his
right mind doubts that the world exists, so whatever reasons there are for doubt are not
felt to be useful. Similarly, Zeno’s paradoxes, which were meant to show that motion is
impossible because it involves infinitely divisible magnitudes, have been solved
repeatedly by thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Galileo, Bertrand Russell and Gilbert
Ryle, who have shown that the paradoxes do not prove that motion is impossible. But
why do they bother? They bother in order to show what motion is, not merely that it
is—and they continue because there has been no universal and permanent agreement
about motion. Similarly, when G. E. Moore proved to a lecturer that the world exists, by
slapping his face, he was asserting that we know that the world exists from the practical
standpoint of having to deal with it rather than by means of reasoning, following in
Locke’s skeptical tradition, based on the idea that the human intellect is fit for
understanding what we need in order to live and what we need to do for eternal
salvation. Even Moore’s slap in the face was based on philosophical principles, albeit
skeptical ones that limit knowledge to control of things rather, as in the Sophistic
tradition discussed above.
If so, then Descartes, who thought the human mind capable of knowledge of the nature
of things, sought to prove the existence of the world in order to acquire knowledge of
nature. Proof of his own existence provided an instance of certainty by means of clarity
and distinctness that enabled him to prove the existence of God as the guarantor of
4
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truth. His proof of the existence of the world, in the last of the Meditations on First
Philosophy, shows that our mathematical knowledge is true of things that actually exist.
That Descartes’ physics based on these principles was rejected in favor of Newton’s,
does not show that his metaphysics, was useless. Indeed his idea of gravity as a vortex
of matter, with empty space, is in some ways more like contemporary physics than was
Newton’s idea of gravity as attraction at a distance. Philosophy is reflection on
problems of life and science, like a craftsperson thinking about his tools: some
redesigned tools turn out to be useful later, sometimes even for unanticipated problems
in other subject matters.
The circumstances that gave rise to the scientific revolution in the 16th and 17th
centuries include both the intellectual and political upheaval that stimulated philosophy
in antiquity. The rejection of the Aristotelianism of the Church and the schoolmen and
the effort to develop a new, mechanical philosophy, inspired in part by the ancient
atomists, occurred while political upheaval, religious conflict, and discovery of the new
world raised fundamental questions about nature and humanity.
The discussion that follows is about a sequence of revolutions in philosophy that turn its
attention to the nature of things and then from that to the ways in which the mind
comes to know and then from that what it is that we do and say when we think about
things. These alternatives, making either things, thoughts, or words and deeds prior,
have been taken up repeatedly in philosophy in antiquity and the medieval period, but
the more recent ones are more familiar and thus better illustrations of variations on the
them of breadth and depth.
II. Revolutions in Philosophy
A. Metaphysical Revolution
Early modern philosophy used mathematics and mechanics to discuss the causes of
things, returning to the ancient distinction between and, nature and
custom, to find the causes of the existence and knowledge of the mind, the world, and
God. These were topics, places of discussion, not assumptions. Skeptical philosophers
argued that self, mind, is incapable of proving that God or the world exists, or, like
Locke, they devised proofs of existence that could determine only existence and not the
nature of things, e. g. whether mind is distinct from matter. Skeptical principles
provided a foundation for science, albeit limited in its ambitions. Among those who
thought that human intellect could do more, Descartes distinguished extended from
thinking substances and both as finite from infinite substance. Spinoza proved that
there is only one substance, one being that exists in and through itself, but it can be
thought in infinitely different ways, e. g., as thought and as extension, and all extended
things and all thoughts are modes that exist in and through that one substance. Leibniz
conceived of the indivisible parts as monads, ideas of the whole universe from each of
the points within it, each operating according to its own idea, so that our experience of
things affecting each other by mechanical causes is apparent, not real. These
metaphysicians argued that knowledge of God proves the existence of the world and
5
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provides a foundation for physics. Some, however, were skeptics, who made self first
and denied knowledge of the world or of God. Others were materialists, who, though
denying knowledge of God, found principles in the particles from which all of nature is
formed.
The idea of sovereignty corresponds in human affairs to the idea of a first cause of the
nature and existence of things. In antiquity, the question was whether man was the
measure, determined the law, or whether it depended on reason and knowledge of
God. In modern thought, and were united in the idea of natural law.
Government was conceived in terms of the law of nature by which each being seeks to
preserve its own nature by forming a more complex nature governed by natural law.
Spinoza argued that all virtue derives from self‐preservation, since to preserve a mind
means for it to know. Other forms of association, from the family as the natural
economic association to religion and education were all subordinated to the sovereignty
of the state. In revolutions that follow, we shall see the state subordinated to economic
and social and then to cultural considerations. If government as well as first philosophy
is reduced to the study of nature, is it any wonder that the natural scientists consider
their subject the first among the sciences, first philosophy?
B. Epistemological Revolution
It was partly awareness of the diversity of profound philosophies, the apparent inability
of all to concur in one view, that led to the idea that philosophy ought to examine its
instrument, the faculties of the human mind, in order to determine what they can and
cannot do, before making any attempt to determine the nature of things. This need was
given dramatic force in the 18th century by the arguments of David Hume, who
described himself as a “moderate skeptic”. He denied the possibility of proving, not
only the existence of God, but that of the mind of the thinker concocting the proofs and
that of the world that seems to present itself to his mind. Only mathematics and
reasoning that shared the feature of having an idea contained in another idea could
reach conclusions with certainty. That means that no reasoning based on experience
can be certain. But this skepticism is moderate because between certainty and doubt
there is probability. Although no empirical beliefs are certain, some have more
evidence supporting them than others.
The new, revolutionary approach to philosophy was established by the response of
Immanuel Kant, who credited Hume with awakening him from his dogmatic slumber.
As Hume placed probability between certainty and doubt, Kant distinguished critique of
the faculties of the mind from skepticism and from dogmatism, which is thinking not
preceded by critique. He called this a “second Copernican revolution” because
Copernicus arrived at a new system of the world by taking into account the motions of
the observer. As physical motions contribute to observed motions, ways of thinking
(the forms of reception of information and of thought that are inherent in the mind)
contribute to what is learned from experience. Like a skeptic, Kant argued that our
senses give us only the appearances of things, not their nature; that our intellect is also
6
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incapable of knowing the nature of things. What thinking makes intelligible is the
appearances of things, not things in themselves, but of appearances we do have
knowledge since it is the mind that sets the standard for intelligibility.
The human mind, then, is incapable of knowing, the triad of things of concern in
metaphysics, self, God, and world. Hume had reached this conclusion in his Treatise of
Human Nature. But other faculties of mind support belief in them. For Hume belief is a
feeling: belief in cause and effect is the feeling of connection between them. For Kant,
beliefs in the self as noumenal, a spiritual being not subject to the mechanistic laws of
nature, and in God as the guarantor of the goodness and justness of the world, are
presuppositions made necessary by the recognition of our duty as a categorical
imperative. For the one philosopher it is the faculty of sentience, feeling, for the other it
is the will that provide the principle that constitutes epistemological depth.
As the effort to base the state on a first cause, the cause of sovereignty, was part of the
metaphysical task to know the causes of things, it too is abandoned in the
epistemological revolution. The epistemological revolution includes consideration of
the human faculties that operate in forming relations with others. In this way, the
precepts that form human associations are like the concepts that are applied to
experience of the world.
Kant analyzed the precept of duty as a categorical imperative into three formulations.
The first has to do with the precept itself, that it be universal so that it has the form of a
law. The second tells us that humanity must always be the matter or interest of the will.
(The idea of not treating others as mere means has long since been ubiquitous in our
culture.) The third shows that the purpose achieved by following this precept is a
“kingdom” or association of human beings in which all rule. This precept of duty
identifies will with practical reason and autonomy.
Mill grabbed the stick by the other end, making utility the moral criterion. Utility has to
do with the consequences of action rather than the intention. Mill concluded that the
utility of freedom is such that individuals ought to be free to do as they wish so long as
their actions are not harmful to others who have not willingly entered into agreement
with them.
When the precept that determines associations with others is the concern of
philosophy, rather than the origin and nature of government, government has one of
the several functions of human association and usually not the most important one.
Mill thought that government in England was no longer a great threat to freedom of
speech, though it might come to use the new real threat. That threat, the tyranny of
majority opinion, is exercised in all social relations. Karl Marx, who developed a theory
of history in terms of the alienation of human faculties of the mind, famously conceived
of economics as the form of association for which all the others, including government,
are mere epiphenomena.
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Kant made reason first, although its highest form was practical reason, the will, not pure
reason. Philosophers of the 19th century who made will first, such as Nietzsche and
Kierkegaard, are among the most widely read and influential. All sciences are
subordinate to psychology, in the sense that it is the science of the mind, since
philosophy had become examination of human faculties. Is it any wonder that the
pyschologists consider it the most important among the sciences, first philosophy
itself?
C. The Revolution of “Words and Deeds”
The attempts to make epistemology the ruling science ended, toward the end of the
19th century, in a second Copernican revolution in philosophy, the idea that
psychologism confuses how the mind works with truth and validity. If we cannot come
to agreement about the first causes of things that enable us to know them, and if we
cannot agree to the way that human faculties operate in achieving knowledge and
making choices, we can turn our attention to concrete experience of things found in
what we do and say when we perceive, interpret, inquire and make choices. In
epistemology, the starting point is two abstract ideas, mind and world, and the problem
is how to make inferences from experience that show us how the one operates in order
to know the other and itself. When we start with concrete experience, awareness of
what we do when we experience, or how we describe experience, mind and world are
merged and made distinct only by distinguishing intention from object of intention (aim
from aimed‐at), or meaning from reference.
Since every action has a purpose, it has an idea about something that is and the idea
gives that thing a certain whatness or meaning. Finding meaning in experience is called
interpretation, or “hermeneutics”, from the Greek term which goes back in philosophy
at least to Aristotle’s . The whatness of experience can be determined
in more than one way because it is a merging of mind, object, and awareness, so each
can be thought to determine the whatness of the others. Thus the whatness of things
can be found in experience, so that they are what they seem to be, or in the only partly
revealed nature of the object, so the real nature of things differs from what it seems to
be and underlies what we experience, or they may be found in the ideas, the intelligible
acts that give experience structure and meaning. Different interpretations are
developed by means of continuing experience in which meaning is added by the use of
ideas that are also changed and deepened in the same process. Focus on the concrete
is not myopic because it has a history, is a continuing way of life, which we call tradition.
In a tradition that is alive, and not merely a memory, ideas and theories make
experience active and intelligent. Ideas that grow out of experience and are tested in it
have their source in things, which is to say that they are not abstractions standing on
their own. The idea tested in an action can be a whole, complex of ideas that form a
theory or way of life of a community. Observations of Mercury in relation to the Sun
distinguished General Relativity from Classical Mechanics and confirmed it as true.
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Ghandi’s “experiments with truth” used traditional Hindu beliefs to give meaning to acts
of protest and resistance that gave birth to a newly independent Indian nation. Albert
Camus’ The Rebel was read by SNCC freedom fighters who gave American meaning to
Camus’ variation on Descartes, “I rebel, ergo we are.” As the art of interpretation
grammar is the ruling art of words and rhetoric, as the art of invention and persuasion,
is the ruling art of action. This new philosophical starting point took three different
forms around the turn of the 20th century in England, Continental Europe, and the
United States.
In England, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein replaced the
Hegelian encyclopedia of philosophy and other forms of German Idealism with
philosophies of language and logic. Aristotle’s logic was the or instrument of
the sciences. In De Interpretatione, he analyzed the proposition into
noun and verb, i. e., subject and predicate. In Bertrand Russell’s Our Knowledge of the
External World (Lowell Lectures in Boston’ 1914) his title for Lecture II, “Logic as the
Essence of Philosophy,” announces the view that logic is the whole of philosophy.
Russell argues that science and philosophy have been held back and misled by
adherence to the Aristotelian idea of the form of proposition as subject and predicate
and of inference as syllogistic. Francis Bacon and Galileo widened he scope of logic to
include induction in the 17th century. Hegel widened it so that it was “practically
identical with metaphysics”, but for Russell this as an example of the “logic of
mysticism” practiced by philosophers like Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, who regard
experience as unintelligible and illusory and are interested only in the super‐sensible.
(This is a fine example of a polemical formulation of one of the kinds of interpretation
referred to above.) The first real advance in logic since the Greeks, according to Russell,
was made by mathematicians in fulfillment of Leibniz’s hope for a mathematical logic
that would guide research in every field. This hope was frustrated by Leibniz’s
reluctance to acknowledge contradictions of Aristotle’s traditional doctrine of the
syllogism.
Russell thinks that the belief that all propositions are of the subject‐predicate form,
“that every fact consists in some thing having some quality,” has rendered philosophers
incapable of giving any account of the world of science and daily life. Asymmetrical
relations, such as father, before, after, greater, above, etc., cannot be explained in terms
of subject and predicate, so philosophers, “unable to admit the reality of relations”,
drew the conclusion that the world of experience is an illusion. Instead, Russell shows
how the world can be accounted for in terms of atomic propositions of relations
between sense data that form single facts, molecular propositions of conjunctions
between propositions, such as or, and if, then, that enable us to make inferences, “so
that from the truth or falsehood of the one something follows as to the truth or
falsehood of the other. All truths would be known if we knew all the atomic facts, but
we would have to know that they were all, that our inventory was complete. So he
concludes that “general truths cannot be inferred from particular truths alone”, must be
9
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self‐evident or inferred from self‐evident premises. Some knowledge must not depend
on the data of sense if there is to be general knowledge and “such general knowledge is
to be found in logic”. Propositions about inference in pure logic are absolutely general
and self‐evident. For Russell, meaning is in experience itself, not in underlying atoms,
but is found in its organization of simple data into atomic facts and those into molecular
facts. Knowledge of universals, such as a universal law of gravity, depends not only on
experience, but on logic, which depends on self‐evident truths.
This is a view of philosophy that reduces it to empirical science except for the a priori
knowledge in logic. By contrast, the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers and
Sartre is almost entirely a priori. Paying homage to Descartes and Kant, it is not a priori
in the metaphysical sense, reasoning from cause to effect, nor in the epistemological
sense of what the mind knows prior to any experience of the world. Phenomenology is
a priori in its description of what experience is that enables it to be an awareness of
something. The Greek word  means to bring to light, make appear or to come to
light, be seen, appear, thus phenomena (in English) are events that appear to us. As an
act of bringing something to light, an event is not something in the mind that came from
and is about the world; it is both, a coming to light or appearing in the doing and saying.
Martin Heidegger’s influence persists in American culture despite the well‐known
ridicule of his writing by some language philosophers and despite his association with
the Nazis. Heidegger’s starting point avoids the mind/world distinction with the idea of
being‐in‐the world. That means that mind and world come to light in the act, so
awareness of them is concrete and particular and is not abstract ideas of two distinct
entities. Our first awareness of things is as equipment, things we use, so our awareness
is a doing and not a mere observing. And yet in order to act, to use things, we must find
ourselves, so to speak, thrown among them, have some possibility of projecting
ourselves in them, and losing ourselves in them, in by taking those possibilities as given
to us by what others say and do. Terms like “thrown”, “projecting”, and “fallen” are
literally about physical events. Here they serve to depict a being that is in in the sense
of among other things, but in also in the sense of being involved with them. The human
being is the being for whom his own being is an issue. This means that in its use of
other things, including its ways of being with other human beings, it chooses its life.
The freedom suggested by the idea of choice means that actions are determined by the
person, but choice is made in consideration of things to be chosen and these
considerations can come from things as they are considered to be by others. This idea
of fallenness suggests the literal idea of a body falling down among things and also the
ethical and religious idea of having lost value and distinction. This is how Heidegger
depicts a person whose being is inauthentic in that he has given over his power of
choice to others. But this very inauthenticity is an a priori possibility for a being that is
open to being and makes itself be in the way in which it is open to it.
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The authentic being of the being open to being has implications not only for that being,
for human life, but for being itself. Regional ontologies are about kinds of beings, such
as living things. For each such kind of being, the ontology is the a priori part of science,
the assumptions made about the nature of the things being studied and the means for
learning about them. If there are kinds of beings, and regional ontologies, then there is
“the Being of beings”, the fundamental ontology that is about the meaning of being and
is thus true of all beings. But just as inauthenticity is an inherent possibility for Dasein
(human being, being‐there), so is oblivion of being.
The history of philosophy for Heidegger is a history of eras in which being is both
manifest and obscured and forgotten. The tradition that has variously conceived being
as a particular thing, conceived as idea, energeia, substance, monad, etc., from Plato to
Nietzsche, reduces being to thought and, ultimately, to power, what can be controlled
by thought, i. e. technology. His idea of the meaning of being is the opposite of Russell’s
collection of simple facts. It is integral, material formed by a logos that develops in
temporally yet is always the same. He expresses these four aspects poetically as earth,
heavens, mortals and immortals because art is a work in which matter is formed, not a
universal thought or a particular event, as Aristotle points out in his Poetics.
The possibility of authentic human being comes from understanding of human being
because it is the place in which being appears. All human being arises from an
awareness of Being; authentic human being arises out of the experience of Being and
not from turning away from it in abstract thought. This is his critique of our
technological age as in oblivion of Being. It is a philosophy that distinguishes the
meaning of being as such, fundamental ontology, from the sciences, which are about
particular kinds of beings that are in distinctive ways. It is like Aristotle’s distinction
between first philosophy and the sciences and quite unlike Russell’s naturalism.
In America, the pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and C. S. Peirce echoed
Husserl’s call to return to the facts. The word  means “that which has been
done” (L. facinus), but as “facts” it also means “a thing, matter, affair” (L. res), drawing
our attention to the fact that facts are made, not given (data), and that philosophy
starts with analysis of concrete experience. Like Heidegger, Dewey criticizes traditional
philosophy as theoretical, i. e. contemplative and aesthetic in the sense of observing for
its own sake. He explains this socially in terms of a split between means or facts,
produced by workers, and ends or values, traditions contemplated and communicated
by a leisure class. The trouble with work devoid of thought is that it lacks the power to
control things that comes only with understanding; the trouble with thought devoid of
work is that its insularity lacks the power to acquire knowledge that comes from what
Francis Bacon called “tutelage to nature”.
When people began to explore the world, to go new places and do new things, their
new experiences led them to reflect on experience as active and not merely as the
reception of information from the world. Tutelage to nature requires active
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intervention in nature. Dewey’s distinction between the traditional, spectator theory of
knowledge and the new way of thinking, the participant theory of knowledge led to his
adaptation of the experimental method of science to what is distinctively human, the
problem of the relation of facts to values. As the problem of philosophy, it is a third
alternative to Russell’s virtual reduction of philosophy to science and Heidegger’s
inquiry into the Being of being as fundamental ontology. The task of relating facts to
values leaves the determination of fact to the science and the adoption of values to
human communities. The task of philosophy arises from a deep and broad rift between
facts and values, requiring an analysis of them to show how to think of the relation
between them so that values can be realized, i. e. made facts.
To be experimental, moral and social thought must include the art of interpretation to
understand the facts of science and the values of communities, and the art of invention
in order to discover what can be done to change facts so that they come to embody
values. Concrete experiences occur in time, so philosophies which describe experience
are therefore histories. As they use arts of interpretation and invention to uncover the
meanings of experience, they are about what could be and have the generality of
literature and art. As they reflect on their methods as philosophy they achieve the
universality of what action and facts must be. Is it any wonder that poets,
rhetoricians, linguists, and historians consider their creations and studies the basis for
all education and thus the first philosophy of human growth by experience?
Polemical communication is war‐like and rejecting. Rudolf Carnap’s dismissal of
Heidegger’s What is Metaphysics? as nonsense is famous. Consider also what Russell
said about Hegel in a footnote in the chapter “Logic is the Essence of Philosophy” from
Our Knowledge of the External World:
“This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing
systems of philosophy are built upon stupid stupid and trivial confusions, which,
but for the almost incredible fact that theyare unintentional, one would be
tempted to characterize as puns.” [italics added]
The irenic alternative is to practice the hermeneutic art by recognizing the ambiguity of
experience and the plausibility of alternative interpretations of it. It is plausible that this
would enable philosophers, and all of us, to learn more from each other, as Mill and
Whewell testified that they learned from their debate as to whether a logic of discovery
is possible. And if this happened, it would mean that they had learned more about the
concrete from which their interpretations arose. This is an idea of philosophy as
communication.
The idea of responsibility arose in the context of the discussion of self‐governing states.
In his notes on the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison refers to the fact that
the president must answer to the citizens who, however indirectly, elected him. The
constitution embodies the civil or political rights of a citizen. This Convention occurred
at the same time that Kant was writing his critiques. There was also a demand, met
later in the first amendments to the Constitution, for a “bill of rights” that committed
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government to protect rights of minorities and of the individual that are not limited to
the relation between government and citizen but extend to other forms of association.
To these social and economic rights, the philosophies of words and deeds have added
discussion of cultural rights. Cultural rights have to do with participation in the
accomplishments of humanity, the arts and sciences, so they put education at the
center of the discussion of human rights. Just as there are different philosophies of
words and deeds, so there are different cultures. If participation in culture means the
opportunity to learn what others have said and done as the true, good, and beautiful, it
is not full participation, since it does not yet include participating in saying and doing.
As with theories of the concrete, cultural rights involve ambiguity and measuring what is
true and good in terms of different meanings.
Richard McKeon showed how responsibility expanded the role of communication to
include reason, rather than being merely the external manifestation of thought.
Persons are responsible for their actions, when they are their free causes, by knowing
choice, and this free and knowing causality means that whatever praise or blame
attaches to the acts are rightly ascribed to those who have done them. But
responsibility means more than that. To be responsible for having done something
means that you have decided what to do and that means that you have applied ideas
about what is good to do. The fact that someone disagrees does not mean that you
were wrong. Even agreement will not persuade you that you are right, if it is, in your
judgment, agreement for the wrong reasons. Responsibility is about learning from
experience, so it cannot mean making up your mind based simply on what other people
say, but it cannot mean making up your mind without considering what they say. You
must act according to your own ideas and take into account those of others. This is the
conundrum that the idea of responsibility is meant to solve.
Responsibility is a way of acting in order to learn. It is like “Writing Across the
Curriculum”, which is about writing to learn and not merely to make public what has
already been learned. This reversal is due to thinking about thinking in terms of what is
public, i. e. doing and saying. With the concept of responsibility, one learns by putting
ideas into action. The responsible person is one who makes his own judgments, but
does so with consideration of what has actually happened and what others think about
it. Although we cannot get to the facts without ideas, the facts are richer than any of
our ideas about them, so ideas contrary to our own may need to be adapted to ours to
afford more penetrating insight into the facts. Among the facts that must be considered
is the fact that most of what we do and want to do depends in some way on the
concurrence and cooperation of others. To make up one’s own mind freely includes
persuading others. The task of responsibility is to develop individuality and community.
Both grow out of common actions, often undertaken for different reasons, that support
the development of free individuals.
The history of philosophy is rich in resources for future innovations in thought and must
be preserved much as biodiversity must be preserved for future understanding and
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benefits for our biological existence. Nor is it enough for philosophy to be preserved
only for the esoteric purposes of a few scholars at fabulously endowed institutions. It
must be preserved at York College too so that our faculty and students will be scholars
in the fullest sense. Responsibility, as the exercise of reciprocal respect, is the advocacy
of tradition as well as innovation. Philosophy helps us to see how our traditions can be
put to use for future benefit. York College is a college because it is a collection of
schools, of arts and sciences and health and business professions. Nowhere is the close
connection between thought and action more evident. The contenders among the
disciplines for first among equals, for first philosophy, are even more numerous than the
ones I have exclaimed in wonder, including those who know that the applied sciences,
so far from being intellectually inferior to the pure ones, include them and can be their
life‐blood and cutting edge. Amidst so many contenders for the title “first philosophy”,
it is a wonder that there is so little talk about philosophy. If Moliere’s would‐be
gentleman learned to his surprise that he had been speaking prose all his life, he needed
to learn next that while prose is a common art, it can be a very demanding and exquisite
one as well.
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